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The Anti-Kickback Statute Standard(s) of
Intent: The Case for a Rule of
Reason Analysis
Timothy J. Aspinwall*
INTRODUCTION
The anti-kickback statute is one of the laws the federal gov-
ernment utilizes in its effort to prevent fraud and abuse against
publicly funded health care programs.' The primary purpose of
this statute is to eliminate unnecessary health care costs and
compromises in quality that can result when providers are given
financial inducements to make referrals. With certain narrow
exceptions, the anti-kickback statute makes it illegal to know-
ingly and willfully solicit, receive, offer or pay any remunera-
tion, in cash or in kind, in exchange for referrals for items or
services for which payment may be made under a federal health
care program.3 Federal courts interpret the statute primarily by
determining whether, in a given case, there was a knowing and
willful intent to induce referrals.4 If there is some remuneration
in connection with referrals, illegal intent can be inferred.
Given this method of interpretation, the legal prohibitions can
apply to a broad spectrum of compensation arrangements, rang-
* Timothy J. Aspinwall is an associate in the Sacramento office of Nossaman,
Guthner, Knox & Elliott. He received his Juris Doctor from Vanderbilt University, a
Masters in Religious Ethics from the University of Chicago, and a Master of Laws
from Loyola University Chicago, Institute for Health Law. The Author would like to
thank Professor Joan Krause of Loyola University Chicago for her many helpful sug-
gestions and for frequently displaying her commitment to teaching. The author would
also like to thank the firm of Epstein, Becker & Green for sponsoring the 1999-2000
Health Law Writing Competition, in which this article was awarded first place.
1. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1994 & Supp. 1997). Other significant federal
statutes include the Civil False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1994 & Supp. 1997), and
the Stark prohibition against physician self-referrals, 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (1994 &
Supp. 1997).
2. See discussion infra Part I.
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1994 & Supp. 1997). Violations are punishable by
a fine of up to $25,000 and/or imprisonment for up to five years. Violators may also
be subject to civil monetary penalties of $50,000 for each violation and three times the
remuneration involved. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7a (West Supp. 1998). They may
also face exclusion from participation in all federal health care programs. See 42
U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
4. See discussion infra Part II.A-C.
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ing from obviously corrupt bribe and kickback schemes, to po-
tentially beneficial patient management agreements between
health care providers.
A significant legal concern among health care providers is
that the anti-kickback statute inadequately distinguishes be-
tween compensation arrangements that should be prohibited be-
cause they encourage inappropriate utilization of health care
resources, and arrangements that should be permitted because
they are likely to improve the quality of care or reduce costs
without unacceptably compromising quality.6 This concern
about the broad reach of the anti-kickback statute was recently
expressed in a colloquium report published by the American
Health Lawyers Association ["AHLA"], a trade association
with a membership of attorneys from both the private and pub-
lic sectors. 7 One significant question that is asked but not an-
swered in the report is whether the anti-kickback statute
appropriately focuses on the intent of the parties as expressed in
their conduct, rather than on the likely effects of a given com-
pensation arrangement on cost and quality.
The focus on intent is conceptually problematic for two rea-
sons. First, the statute's standard of intent is unclear. This is
evident in the division between federal appellate courts on the
issue.' To the extent there is clarity, it exists primarily in circuits
that give a very broad reading to the prohibitions. 10 The stan-
dard of intent is less clear in circuits that take a more nuanced
approach." Second, as can be inferred from the question asked
in the AHLA colloquium report, a focus on party intent is a
poor method by which to prevent inappropriate utilization of
health care resources.' 2 A legal standard that focuses on the
likely outcome of the arrangement rather than the perceived in-
5. See discussion infra Part II.D.
6. See discussion infra Part III.
7. See AMERICAN HEALTH LAWYERS ASS'N, FRAUD AND ABUSE: Do CURRENT
LAWS PROTECT THE PUBLIC INTEREST? 33 (1999) [hereinafter AHLA].
8. See id. at 22.
9. Compare United States v. Starks, 157 F.3d 833, 839 (11th Cir. 1998) (approving
the trial court's jury instruction requiring the prosecution to show the defendants had
a general bad intent to disobey or disregard the law) with Hanlester Network v.
Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1400 (9th Cir. 1995) (requiring proof the defendants specifically
intended to violate the anti-kickback statute) and United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d
68, 71 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding a violation of the anti-kickback statute occurs if any one
purpose of a compensation arrangement is to induce referrals).
10. See Greber, 760 F.2d at 71.
11. See Hanlester, 51 F.3d at 1400.
12. See AHLA, supra note 7 at 22.
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tent of the parties would be a clearer, more effective way to pre-
vent inappropriate utilization.
A very practical problem with the anti-kickback statute as
currently conceived is that it results in significant social costs.
First, health care payers and providers expend substantial legal
fees developing strategies to navigate the statutory ambiguities
surrounding the issue of intent. 13 In addition to these expenses,
the uncertainty surrounding the standard of intent leads to sig-
nificant foregone opportunities to the extent that potentially
beneficial health care arrangements are never implemented be-
cause of possible anti-kickback liability.' 4 These costs indicate
unnecessary tensions between the government's need to prevent
inappropriate utilization and the desire among health care prov-
iders to implement compensation arrangements that optimize
quality and efficiency. 15
There has not been enough discussion of a possible legal stan-
dard that would take cost and quality into account in anti-kick-
back cases. 16 The objective of this article is to make the case for
a standard of reasonableness under which compensation ar-
rangements would be judged substantially on the basis of
whether they increase cost-effectiveness as measured by a cost/
13. See AHLA, supra note 7 at 24.
14. See James F. Blumstein, Rationalizing the Fraud and Abuse Statute, 15
HEALTH AFi. 118, 118-19 (1996) (suggesting that current fraud and abuse laws dis-
courage forms of integration that enhance both quality and efficiency); see also
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Sharon Davies, The Fraud and Abuse Statute: Rationalizing
or Rationalization?, 15 HEALTH AFF. 129-31 (1996) (agreeing with Blumstein that the
anti-kickback statute discourages some efficient business arrangements).
15. Cf. Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of
(a Particular Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197, 1203 (1997) (stating irra-
tionality in social institutions can lead to conflicts between competing concerns that
are not, in principle, incompatible).
16. See Tamsen Douglass Love, Note, Toward a Fair and Practical Definition of
"Willfully" in the Medicare/Medicaid Anti-Kickback Statute, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1029,
1057 (1997) (arguing the word "willfully" in the anti-kickback statute should be con-
strued to require that the defendant acted with corrupt intent).
Some critics propose safe harbors that specify:
(1) that inducing future referrals must be a 'significant' (and not just any)
purpose in the financial arrangements among providers; (2) that reducing
Medicare or Medicaid costs is a defense to a prospective fraud and abuse
violation in the absence of significant, unacceptable decreases in the level of
quality; and (3) that a defense to a prospective fraud and abuse violation is
established when improved quality or choice is provided to program benefi-
ciaries at no increased costs.
See Blumstein, supra note 14, at 126; but see Jost & Davies, supra note 14, at 131
(asserting that Blumstein's proposed quality or efficiency defenses would increase un-
certainty about the applicability of the anti-kickback statute).
2000]
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quality ratio.17 The term "cost-effectiveness," as used here,
takes into account both costs and quality of clinical outcomes.
As such, an improvement in cost-effectiveness indicates a more
optimal balance between cost and quality.1 8
The claim underlying this proposal is that the current formula-
tion of the anti-kickback statute, with the emphasis on intent, is
unclear and unnecessarily broad as a means to prevent inappro-
priate utilization. A more useful approach would take into ac-
count the broadest possible set of costs and benefits associated
with a given compensation arrangement. Ideally, the anti-kick-
back statute would prevent compensation arrangements that
needlessly increase costs or threaten to degrade the quality of
care, but permit innovative arrangements that improve cost-
effectiveness.
Under the standard of reasonableness proposed here, the par-
ties to certain categories of compensation arrangements would
be able to defend an anti-kickback claim by asserting that the
arrangement in question will increase cost-effectiveness in
health care. This defense would not be available to parties en-
gaged in blatantly unethical payment schemes. 19 But under
most circumstances, compensation arrangements that improve
cost-effectiveness would be permitted; those that do not would
be condemned under the anti-kickback statute.
A cost-effectiveness approach to the anti-kickback statute is
appropriate because in a world of finite resources, legislative re-
strictions that discourage or prevent cost-effective arrangements
will, other things being equal, drive up costs and reduce demand
for health care. Health care is not exempt from the economic
forces of supply and demand.20 The reality is that increased
costs reduce the availability of health care, which will ultimately
take its toll on individual lives.21 Given these consequences, a
17. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
18. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
19. See discussion infra Part II.A-C.
20. Cf Troyen A. Brennan, Moral Imperatives Versus Market Solutions: Is Health
Care a Right? 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (reviewing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL
PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE? (1997)). Brennan argues that
managed care brings economic incentives to bear upon the patient-physician relation-
ship. See id. at 346 (citing ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MAN-
AGED COMPETITION IN HEALTH CARE FINANCE 9 (1988). See also CLARK C.
HAVIGHURST, DEREGULATING THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY: PLANNING FOR COM-
PETITION 14 (1982).
21. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 298 (1997). Sun-
stein suggests regulations that increase the cost of health care will produce a health-
[Vol. 9
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rational approach to health care legislation must include an un-
derstanding of the costs and benefits associated with a given law
or regulation.
Part I of this article begins with an overview of the history and
purpose of the anti-kickback statute. There are two primary
objectives in this section. The first is to show through legislative
history that Congress enacted the anti-kickback statute to pre-
vent inappropriate utilization, thereby preventing unnecessary
costs and protecting quality. The second point is to show that
Congress attempted to reduce the ambiguity of the anti-kick-
back prohibitions by adding a knowing and willful requirement
to the standard of intent. This section also discusses whether
safe harbors and advisory opinions issued by the Office of the
Inspector General ["OIG"] of the Department of Health and
Human Services ["HHS"] provide sufficient protection and clar-
ity. One clear limitation of safe harbors is that all elements of a
compensation arrangement must fall within a safe harbor for the
arrangement to be protected. The utility of advisory opinions is
limited by the fact that the OIG will not opine on the re-
quester's intent, and that advisory opinions refer to the broadest
possible construction of intent.22
Part II examines three different lines of circuit court cases on
the anti-kickback standard of intent, one of which is endorsed
by the OIG. This discussion looks closely at the case law fa-
vored by the OIG, and how the other circuits interpret the will-
fulness requirement to develop different standards of intent for
the anti-kickback statute. There is also a brief discussion of two
types of arrangements that implicate the anti-kickback statute:
gainsharing and disease management programs. Though the
OIG recently issued a statement declaring gainsharing arrange-
ments illegal,23 both types of arrangements have been selected
health trade-off, whereby the increased costs will make health care less widely availa-
ble. See id. (citing ADA v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823, 826 (7th Cir. 1993).
OSHA also exaggerates the number of lives likely to be saved by the rule
[designed to control the spread of AIDS and hepatitis among health care
workers] by ignoring the lives likely to be lost by it. Since the increased cost
of medical care, to the extent passed on to consumers, will reduce demand
for medical care, and some people may lose their lives as a result.
Id.
22. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion No. 98-19 <http://www.dhhs.gov/progorg/oig/ad-
vopn> (citing United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1985)).
23. See Publication of the OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on Gainsharing Ar-
rangements and CMPs for Hospital Payments to Physicians to Reduce or Limit Ser-
vices to Beneficiaries, 64 Fed. Reg. 37985 (1999).
2000]
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for discussion here to illustrate the limitations of an intent-based
statute in accommodating innovative compensation plans.
Part III proposes adopting a standard of reasonableness, using
cost-effectiveness as the primary criterion. Such a standard can
be modeled after the rule of reason as developed in antitrust
law. Two lines of argument are presented to support this propo-
sal. First, not all compensation arrangements that provide some
incentive to make referrals are so obviously and inherently lack-
ing in social value that they should be viewed as objectionable
per se. Second, a legal standard that requires a balancing of
costs and benefits is more likely to serve the public interest and
to give the health care industry a reasonable point of reference
in navigating the ambiguities of the anti-kickback statute.
Part IV examines some of the practical issues involved in a
cost-benefit analysis of compensation arrangements within the
terms of the anti-kickback statute. Some attention is given here
to the cost/quality variables that must be addressed in any ade-
quate cost-benefit analysis in health care. The discussion then
returns briefly to gainsharing and disease management pro-
grams to assess how these compensation arrangements might
fare under a cost-benefit approach to the anti-kickback statute.
This paper concludes by reasserting the claim that a cost-ben-
efit outcomes-based approach to the anti-kickback statute
would better serve the public interest by reducing tensions be-
tween the needs in private industry to maximize efficiency and
the governmental imperative to prevent fraud and abuse. This
tension can be addressed with a law that gives adequate atten-
tion to outcomes, rather than focusing primarily on the intent of
the parties.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE ANTI-
KICKBACK STATUTE
The anti-kickback statute was originally enacted in 1972 to re-
duce unnecessary governmental health care expenditures and
control inappropriate utilization.24 The original statute made it
24. See H.R. REP. No. 92-231 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4989, 5093
(directing attention to "certain practices which have long been regarded by profes-
sional organizations as unethical, as well as unlawful in some jurisdictions, and which
contribute appreciably to the cost of the medicare and medicaid programs."). See also
H.R. REP. No. 95-393 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3039, 3055.
According to the OIG, the anti-kickback statute is intended to protect federal
funds, to guard against the over-utilization of medical services and supplies, and to
prevent anticompetetive conduct in the health care market. See 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952,
[Vol. 9
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a misdemeanor for anyone to solicit, receive, offer, or pay a
kickback, bribe, or rebate in connection with the provision of
items or services for which payment may be made under Medi-
care or Medicaid. Defendants convicted of the crime could be
punished by a fine of up to $10,000, one year imprisonment, or
both.25 If subsequent amendments are any indication, the 1972
statute was deficient in at least three respects: (1) the statute did
not provide adequate deterrence, in that violations were punish-
able as misdemeanors rather than as felonies; (2) the statute did
not have a scienter requirement, thus possibly including both in-
tentional and inadvertent violations; and (3) the prohibitions fo-
cused exclusively on kickbacks, bribes, and rebates without
specifically including other remunerations intended to induce
referrals, such as office space or administrative services at be-
26 thslow-market prices. In these last two respects, the statute was
both too broad and too narrow.
In 1977, amendments were enacted to increase the level of
deterrence and to remove ambiguities regarding the types of re-
munerations prohibited. The amendments upgraded the crime
to a felony, punishable by $25,000, five years imprisonment, or
both. 8 Moreover, ambiguities about the reach of the statute
were addressed by expanding the prohibition to include "any re-
muneration. ' ' 29 However, concern emerged that the expanded
35,954 (1991) (citing United States v. Ruttenberg, 625 F.2d 173, 177 n.9 (7th Cir.
1980)). But see James F. Blumstein, The Fraud and Abuse Statute in an Evolving
Health Care Marketplace: Life in the Health Care Speakeasy, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 205,
207 n.15 (1996) (arguing disclosure rules and informed consent requirements would
be better suited than the anti-kickback statute to regulate a physician's fiduciary duty
to a patient, as physicians may be motivated by financial incentives to over utilize).
25. See Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 242(b), 86 Stat. 1329, 1419 (1972) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1994)).
26. See id.
27. See Medicare and Medicaid - Antifraud and Abuse Amendments, H.R. RP.
No. 95-393 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3039, 3055 (recommending penal-
ties for anti-kickback violations be increased from misdemeanor to felony status to
provide an adequate deterrent).
28. See Pub. L. No. 95-142, § 4(b)(1), 91 Stat. 1175, 1180 (1977) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396(h)(1994)).
29. See id. The use of the term "any remuneration" resolved a split among circuit
courts over the issue of what constitutes a kickback, bribe or rebate. See Love, supra
note 16, at 1035 (comparing United States v. Porter, 591 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1979) and
United States v. Zacher, 586 F.2d 912 (2d Cir. 1978), which defined bribe or kickback
narrowly under the 1972 statute, with United States v. Tapert, 625 F.2d 111 (6th Cir.
1980) and United States v. Hancock, 604 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1979), which defined bribe
or kickback broadly under the 1972 statute.
2000]
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statute might ensnare individuals for "inadvertent conduct, '3°
and in 1980 the statute was again amended to prevent this occur-
rence.3 1 The amended statute specified that persons can be
prosecuted only if they "knowingly and willfully" engage in un-
lawful conduct. 32 This mens rea requirement is a legislative ef-
fort to provide some protection to the unwary. However, the
courts have not reached agreement on the meaning of the term
"willfully"-a fact that makes it difficult to develop a clear stan-
dard of intent.33
Ambiguity about the meaning of the anti-kickback statute
was addressed again in 1987. Congress, in conjunction with the
Attorney General, sought to develop "safe harbor" regulations
that would not subject the parties to penalties under the law.34
Within HHS, the OIG is responsible for developing and inter-
30. See Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, H.R. REP. No. 96-1167, at 59 (1980),
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5526, 5572.
31. See Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 917, 94 Stat. 2599, 2625 (1980) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn, 1396(h)(1994)).
32. See id.
In relevant part, the anti-kickback statute now reads as follows:
(b) Illegal remunerations.
(1) whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any remuneration
(including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or
covertly, in cash or in kind-
(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the furnishing or
arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be
made in whole or in part under a Federal health care program, or
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for or recom-
mending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item
for which payment may be made in whole or in part under a Federal health
care program, shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall
be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years,
or both.
(2) whoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any remuneration (in-
cluding any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or co-
vertly, in cash or in kind to any person to induce such person-
(A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging for the
furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be made in whole
or in part under a Federal health care program, or
(B) to purchase, lease, order, or arrange for or recommend purchasing, leas-
ing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item for which payment may be
made in whole or in part under a Federal health care program, shall be guilty
of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $25,000
or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1994 & Supp. 1997).
33. See discussion infra Part II.
34. See Medicare and Medicaid Patient Program Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-93, § 14, 101 Stat. 680, 697-98 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b
(1994 & Supp. 1997)).
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preting the safe harbors. There are presently twenty-one safe
harbors that have been finalized.35 Payment arrangements that
meet the criteria of one or more of the finalized safe harbors are
protected from prosecution. But, the safe harbors are narrowly
drawn and strictly construed. 36 As a consequence, very few ar-
rangements will be completely protected.
Though the Department of Justice and the GIG will not pros-
ecute all arrangements that fail to qualify for safe harbor protec-
tion, the uncertainty is a significant source of concern for the
health care industry.37 The decision whether or not to prosecute
depends substantially upon a case-by-case evaluation of whether
the requisite intent to induce referrals exists. 38 Because the
GIG continues to refer back to the question of intent, this ambi-
guity in safe practices persists. The OIG concedes this problem
in its published comments and responses to proposed safe
harbors, where it states that there is "no way to predict the de-
gree of risk" for arrangements that fall outside of a safe
harbor.39
35. Safe harbors cover the following types of arrangements: (1) Investment inter-
ests, (2) Space rental, (3) Equipment rental, (4) Personal services and management
contracts, (5) Sale of practice, (6) Referral services, (7) Warranties, (8) Discounts, (9)
Employees, (10) Group purchasing organizations, (11) Waiver of beneficiary coinsur-
ance and deductible amounts, (12) Increased coverage, reduced cost-sharing amounts,
or reduced premium amounts offered by health plans, (13) Price reductions offered to
health plans, (14) Practitioner recruitment, (15) Obstetrical malpractice insurance
subsidies, (16) Investments in group practices, (17) Cooperative hospital service orga-
nizations, (18) Ambulatory surgical centers, (19) Referral arrangements for specialty
services, (20) Price reductions offered to eligible managed care organizations, (21)
Price reductions offered by contractors with substantial financial risk to managed care
organizations. See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (1999).
36. See Scott J. Kelly, Comment, The Health Insurance Portability and Accounta-
bility Act of 1996: A Medicare Advisory Opinion Mandate Sends the Inspector General
"Shopping for Hats," 59 OHIO ST. L. J. 303, 313 (1998) (citing Hugh E. Aaron, Appli-
cation of the Medicare and Medicaid Anti-Kickback Statute to Business Arrangements
Between Hospitals and Hospital-Based Physicians, 1 ANNALS HEALTH L. 53, 63
(1992)).
37. See 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952, 35,954 (1991).
38. See 63 Fed. Reg. 38,311, 38317 (1998). See also United States v. Bay State
Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 874 F.2d 20, 29 (1st Cir. 1989). While intent
to induce referrals remains key to the OIG's evaluation of a given compensation ar-
rangement, the OIG will also consider the impact that a given arrangement has on
quality, cost and overutilization. See generally 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952 (1991).
39. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952, 35,958 (1991). Another issue, not addressed in this essay,
is whether the safe harbor legislation is fundamentally flawed because the OIG serves
as both the promulgator and interpreter of safe harbors. See Pub. L. No. 100-93, § 14,
101 Stat. 680, 697-98 ("The Secretary of Health and Human Services,.... in consulta-
tion with the Attorney General,... shall promulgate final regulations, specifying pay-
ment practices that shall not be treated as a criminal offense .... ).
9
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This lack of predictability gave force to the view that addi-
tional guidance from the OIG should be available. 40 In 1996,
Congress enacted the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act ["HIPAA"], which required HHS to issue advi-
sory opinions under the anti-kickback statute upon request by a
party to a payment arrangement.41 The OIG must provide advi-
sory opinions on arrangements involving, but not limited to, the
following types of issues: (1) what constitutes a prohibited remu-
neration; (2) whether an arrangement fits within a statutory ex-
ception; and (3) whether an arrangement falls within a safe
harbor.42 According to the legislative history, the purpose of the
advisory opinion requirement is to remove some of the "chilling
effect" the statutory ambiguity imposed upon provider develop-
ment of new and innovative health care delivery systems.43
To provide some insight into the OIG's institutional perspec-
tive, it is worth setting forth a brief background of the advisory
opinion process. As early as 1980, the OIG experimented with
advisory letters by issuing some on its own volition without a
legislative mandate. However, by 1991 the OIG stopped provid-
ing these advisory letters on the basis that HHS was not author-
ized to approve an illegal arrangement, and that the
Department of Justice had exclusive authority to enforce federal
criminal statutes.44 As early as 1988, the OIG showed signs of
fundamental opposition to the use of advisory opinions, arguing
it could not make an adequate determination about a proposed
arrangement on the basis of only written information, and that
an advisory opinion in one situation could hinder prosecution in
another. 45 The inherent difficulty of making a prospective de-
termination about the application of an intent-based statute may
explain the OIG's reluctance.46
Although advisory opinions allow payers and providers to ob-
tain an opinion from the OIG before entering into an arrange-
ment, there is a substantial limitation: advisory opinions will not
40. See H.R. REP. No. 104-496, at 84-85 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1865, 1884-85.
41. See Pub. L. No. 104-191 § 205(b), 110 Stat. 1936, 2001 (1996).
42. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7d(b)(2) (19xx).
43. See H.R. REP. No. 104-496, at 84-85 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1865, 1884-5.
44. See 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952, 35,959 (1991).
45. See 53 Fed. Reg. 51,856, 51,857 (1988).
46. See Jost & Davies, supra note 14, at 131 (suggesting the advisory opinion pro-
cess may be difficult to implement because it requires the OIG to evaluate criminal
intent through an administrative process).
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be provided on the issue of fair market value for goods or ser-
vices. 47 Consequently, it is impossible to get a binding determi-
nation on a question that goes straight to the issue of intent. If
the compensation in any given arrangement is at fair market
value, it is less likely that the payments are intended to induce
referrals.
The 1980 amendments adding a willfulness element to the
anti-kickback statute, the 1987 safe harbor requirements, and
the 1996 advisory opinion mandate all attempted to enhance the
utility of the statute by making it fairer and more understanda-
ble. While these measures may have accomplished some of
their objectives, the core of the problem persists: there is no
clearly defined standard of intent.
II. THE STANDARD(S) OF INTENT
The federal appellate courts disagree on the standard of intent
required by the anti-kickback statute. There are essentially
three views among the circuits. The broadest interpretation of
the anti-kickback prohibitions is held by the Third Circuit and
favored by the OIG. In United States v. Greber, the Third Cir-
cuit held that if any one purpose of a compensation arrange-
ment is to induce referrals, the arrangement violates the anti-
kickback statute.48 However, such a statement raises the ques-
tion: what level of intent is necessary to establish knowing and
willful participation in a prohibited compensation arrangement?
The other two views more carefully examine the willfulness
requirement, but come to different conclusions about the pre-
cise meaning of the term as applied in the anti-kickback statute.
In Hanlester Network v. Shalala, the Ninth Circuit interpreted
the term "willfully" to mean that the prosecution must show
that the defendants both knew of the anti-kickback prohibitions
and acted with the specific intent to violate that law.49
Another line of circuit court cases interpreting the willfulness
requirement holds that the anti-kickback statute calls for a less
stringent standard of intent. This set of cases is well-represented
by the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Starks,50 which holds
that the prosecution must show the defendant acted with the
general bad intent to knowingly disobey or intentionally disre-
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(b)(3) (Supp. 1997).
48. See 760 F.2d 68, 71 (3d Cir. 1985).
49. 51 F.3d 1390, 1400 (9th Cir. 1995).
50. 157 F.3d 833 (11th Cir. 1998)
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gard the law. 1 This standard of intent is distinct from Hanlester
in that it does not require proof that the defendant knew of or
intended to violate the anti-kickback statute itself.
The purpose of the following discussion is to examine whether
Greber, Hanlester or Starks provide a standard of intent that ad-
equately accounts for the different types of arrangements pro-
hibited by the anti-kickback statute, and that reasonably
balances law enforcement and private imperatives. A significant
point here is that the anti-kickback statute applies to a variety of
arrangements, some of which are obviously corrupt and others
of which are not. Arguably, fairness requires a high level of in-
tent in cases where the compensation arrangement does not ap-
pear to be corrupt. On the other hand, predictability demands a
uniform and consistent standard. A more fundamental point of
inquiry is whether any of these standards offers the most effec-
tive way to achieve the congressional intent of protecting quality
while preventing inappropriate utilization.52
A. Greber and Kats
The Greber opinion is known most for its holding that if even
one purpose of a payment is to induce referrals, the compensa-
tion arrangement violates the anti-kickback statute.5 3 Given the
particular facts, the holding is unsurprising. First, the kickback
scheme was blatant. Greber was an osteopathic physician and
president of Cardio-Med, an organization he formed to provide
diagnostic services for physicians. Physicians would refer pa-
tients to Cardio-Med for diagnostic monitoring services, includ-
ing the use of a Holter-monitor, a device which produces a tape
of a patient's cardiac activity. Cardio-Med billed Medicare for
the diagnostic services and forwarded a portion of the payment
to the referring physician for interpretation and patient consul-
tation fees. In most instances, Cardio-Med, not the referring
physician, performed the interpretation. Moreover, Cardio-
Med paid the referring physicians regardless of whether they
performed any interpretation or consultation services. On this
point, the government introduced testimony given by Greber in
an earlier civil proceeding that "'if the doctor didn't get his con-
51. See also United States v. Davis, 132 F.3d 1092 (5th Cir. 1998); United States
v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Neufeld, 908 F. Supp. 491 (S.D.
Ohio 1995).
52. See supra text accompanying note 24.
53. See Greber, 760 F.2d at 69.
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sulting fee, he wouldn't be using our service. So the doctor got a
consulting fee.' ' 54
Faced with his own admission that one purpose of the pay-
ments was to induce referrals from physicians, Greber argued
the prosecution must show that the only purpose of the pay-
ments was to induce referrals. Not surprisingly, this argument
failed to persuade the court. Rather than attempt to discern
Greber's mixed motives, the court focused on the simple ques-
tion of whether Greber intended to induce referrals with these
obvious kickbacks. The court held that an intent by Greber to
induce referrals would not be excused simply because some of
the payments were also intended as compensation for diagnostic
interpretations.
In Kats v. United States, the Ninth Circuit followed the lead of
Greber on an equally egregious kickback scheme.56 The appel-
lant Kats was a 25 percent owner of a medical clinic that re-
ferred blood and urine samples to a certain diagnostic
laboratory on the condition the laboratory kick back to the
clinic 50 percent of the Medicare payments attributable to the
referrals 7.5  As part owner, Kats directly benefited from the
scheme, and on this basis was convicted of violating the anti-
kickback statute. 8
On the facts presented, the Greber and Kats holdings do not
necessarily impose an undue burden on innovative compensa-
tion arrangements. However, the OIG gives a very broad read-
ing to the "one purpose" rule, which includes many
arrangements that are quite common and not obviously cor-
rupt.59 The OIG's very broad interpretation of these cases is
significant because the OIG serves as the promulgator of safe
harbors, the issuer of advisory opinions, and the prosecutor of
civil violations.6 ° In these combined multiple roles, the OIG can
54. Id. at 70.
55. See id. at 71.
56. 871 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1989).
57. See id. at 106-07.
58. See id. at 107.
59. See Alice G. Gosfield, The New Playing Field, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J. 869, 881
(1997). The OIG Comment and Response section preceding 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952
(1991), frequently cites United States v. Bay State Ambulance and Hospital Rental Ser-
vice, Inc., 874 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1989), for that decision's focus on the intent of the
parties, rather than the impact of a given compensation arrangement. Id.
60. See Medicare and Medicaid Patient Program Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-93, § 14, 101 Stat. 680, 697-98 (1987) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320a-7b (1994 & Supp. 1997)).
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essentially determine the terms of debate on what constitutes a
violation. And given the severity of penalties, including possible
exclusion from government-funded health care programs, health
care providers are more likely to settle than to challenge the
OIG position.
B. Hanlester and Ratzlaf
The Ninth Circuit's Hanlester decision is important because
the court interpreted the anti-kickback statute to require a
showing of specific intent to prove a violation.61 The facts and
procedural history of this case are convoluted, but can be sum-
marized as follows: Hanlester Network ["Hanlester"] was a
joint venture partnership that offered shares in its clinical labo-
ratories to physicians who were in a position to refer business to
its labs. Hanlester contracted with SmithKline BioScience Lab-
oratories ["SKBL"], for SKBL to provide laboratory manage-
ment services to all labs in which the Hanlester partnership had
an ownership interest. SKBL also entered into separate agree-
ments with Hanlester-owned laboratories under which the labs
paid a monthly fee to SKBL for its services. The net effect of
these agreements was that SKBL ran the Hanlester labs and re-
turned approximately twenty-four percent of the profit to
Hanlester.62 From the government's perspective, this looked
like a cleverly disguised kickback arrangement, providing the
Hanlester appellants with a share of the net profits in exchange
for test referrals to SKBL.63
After an investigation of the joint venture, the OIG notified
Hanlester of its intention to recommend that the parties to these
agreements be excluded from Medicare and state Medicaid pro-
grams for varying periods of time.64 The Hanlester appellants
requested an administrative hearing on the proposed exclusions,
after which the Administrative Law Judge ["AL"] declined to
impose permissive exclusions.65 The government appealed to
the Departmental Appeals Board, which, after remanding the
matter for further proceedings, vacated the ALJ's decision not
to exclude all of the appellants.66 The Hanlester appellants then
61. See Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1405 (9th Cir. 1995).
62. See id. at 1400.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 1395.
65. See id.
66. See id.
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appealed to the district court, which granted summary judgment
for the government, thus allowing for exclusion.67
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the Hanlester appellants ar-
gued that the anti-kickback statute is inherently vague in that it
fails to clearly describe the prohibited conduct. 68 The Hanlester
court analyzed this argument in light of four criteria established
by the Supreme Court: (1) whether the anti-kickback statute
involves only economic regulation; (2) whether the statute in-
volves only civil and not criminal penalties; (3) whether the stat-
ute includes a heightened scienter requirement; and (4) whether
the statute implicates any constitutionally protected rights.69
The court observed that the anti-kickback statute involves only
economic conduct, and does not chill any constitutional rights.71
The court also noted that the prohibitions had been significantly
clarified by the 1977 amendment, which broadened the statute
to include "any remuneration. '' 71 Most significantly, while the
statute involves possible criminal penalties, the court found the
requirement that violations be committed "knowingly and will-
fully" mitigates any statutory vagueness. 72
The Hanlester court held that the "knowingly and willfully"
language required the prosecution to show: (1) the defendants
knew that the anti-kickback statute prohibits offering or paying
remuneration to induce referrals, and (2) the defendants en-
gaged in the alleged conduct with the specific intent to violate
the law.73 One is left to infer that even if the statute is vague,
the specific intent requirement prevents an unfair result.
The court interpreted the terms "knowingly and willfully" by
examining Supreme Court cases on the issue, paying particular
attention to Ratzlaf v. United States.74 In this case, Ratzlaf paid
$100,000 to partially satisfy a gambling debt to a casino in Reno,
Nevada, by purchasing a series of cashiers checks, each for less
than $10,000, from different banks. The government argued
67. See id. at 1396.
68. See id. at 1397.
69. See id. at 1398 citing Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, 455 U.S. 489,
498-500 (1982). See also United States v. Neufeld, 908 F. Supp. 491, 494-95 (S.D.
Ohio 1995) (using the same analysis).
70. See id. at 1398.
71. See id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-393 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3039, 3056).
72. See id. at 1398 (citing United States v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental
Serv., Inc., 874 F.2d 20, 32-33 (1st Cir. 1989)).
73. See id. at 1400.
74. 510 U.S. 135 (1994).
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that Ratzlaf intentionally structured these financial transactions
to avoid triggering currency reporting requirements mandating
that banks and other financial institutions (including casinos) re-
port cash transactions in excess of $10,000. 75 Ratzlaf clearly
knew of these currency reporting requirements because casino
personnel had told him how to avoid them.76 However, there
was no evidence that Ratzlaf knew of a related law making it
illegal for a person to structure financial transactions with the
purpose of evading a financial institution's reporting require-
ments-the law under which he was convicted.77
At trial, the judge instructed the jury of the prosecution's bur-
den to prove Ratzlaf knew of the currency reporting require-
ment and he structured his transactions to avoid triggering that
requirement. However, the prosecution was not required to
prove Ratzlaf knew that his conduct was unlawful.78 Based on
the judge's instructions and the facts presented at trial, the jury
convicted Ratzlaf of "willfully violating" the antistructuring
laws.79 The conviction was upheld on appeal by the Ninth
Circuit.80
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the jury could not
convict Ratzlaf of the crimes charged unless it found that he
knew his conduct was unlawful.8 The Court focused substan-
tially on the meaning of the word "willfully," observing that the
word has many different meanings which are influenced by con-
text.82 This is an unsettling point.83 Given that guilt or inno-
cence in complex cases often hinges upon establishing the
requisite mens rea, one could reasonably hope the essential term
"willfully" would be clearly defined within the context of a given
75. See id. at 136 (describing Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (1994)).
76. See id. at 137.
77. See Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1994).
78. See United States v. Ratzlaf, 976 F.2d 1280, 1282 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting the
district court judge's jury instructions).
79. See id. at 1280 (applying 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a) (1994)).
80. See id.
81. See Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 149 (citing Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199
(1991)). The Court compared the statutory proof requirements in a case of criminal
tax evasion with the antistructuring laws, and upheld the assertion that a statutory
provision requiring knowledge of illegality does not dishonor the general principle
that ignorance of the law is not a defense against a criminal charge. See id.
82. See id. at 141.
83. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(8) note on definition of "willfully" (Proposed
Official Draft 1962) (stating the term "willful" is "unusually ambiguous standing
alone").
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statute.84 With this apparent objective, the Court examined in-
terpretations of the word "willfully" within the context of the
antistructuring laws. The Court noted that the federal circuits
have consistently applied the term in other provisions within the
same subchapter as requiring "'knowledge of the reporting re-
quirement' and a 'specific intent to commit the crime,' i.e., 'a
purpose to disobey the law."' 85 The majority adopted this defi-
nition. The Court here was clearly concerned that there should
be only one interpretation of the term "willfully" as applied to
the various provisions of the antistructuring statute.86 The dis-
sent, however, was careful to cite opinions from nine different
circuits in which the prosecution in antistructuring cases was not
required to show that the defendant knew his conduct was ille-
gal.87 This division among circuits supports the observation by
the Ratzlaf majority that the word "willful" has different
meanings.
Though the Supreme Court in Ratzlaf was obviously con-
cerned that a uniform interpretation of the willfulness require-
ment apply to the antistructuring provisions, the Court also
seemed persuaded primarily by principles of fairness. A person
should not be prosecuted for apparently innocent conduct with-
out fair warning of the legal prohibitions. 88 The Court pointed
out that structuring financial transactions to avoid reporting re-
quirements is not so obviously or inherently corrupt that an un-
lawful intent can be presumed. 89 There are any number of
legitimate reasons why a person might intentionally avoid cash
84. See Rachael Simonoff, Ratzlaf v. United States: The Meaning of "Willful" and
the Demands of Due Process, 28 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 397, 400-01 (1995)
(discussing three standards of willfullness that have been developed by the courts with
respect to the antistructuring laws).
85. See Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 141 (citations omitted).
86. See id. at 143.
87. See id. at 152 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Baydoun, 984
F.2d 175, 180 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Jackson, 983 F.2d 757, 767 (7th Cir.
1993); United States v. Shirk, 981 F.2d 1382, 1389-92 (3d Cir. 1992), vacated, 114 S. Ct.
873 (1994); United States v. Rogers, 962 F.2d 342, 343-45 (4th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Beaumont, 972 F.2d 91, 93-95 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Gibbons, 968
F.2d 639, 643-45 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Brown, 954 F.2d 1563, 1567-69 (11th
Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 900 (1992); United States v. Dashney, 937 F.2d 532,
537-40 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 951 (1991); United States v. Scanio, 900 F.2d
485, 489-92 (2d Cir. 1990), appeal dismissed, 37 F.3d 858 (2d Cir. 1994)).
88. See id. at 146-49.
89. See id. at 146.
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transactions in excess of $10,000.90 The implication here is that
it would be unfair to criminalize apparently innocent conduct
without requiring a showing of a bad intent.9' This is consistent
with the Court's interpretation that the willfulness language re-
quires the prosecution to show that the defendant actually knew
his conduct was unlawful.9
2
The fact that Hanlester cites Ratzlaf to interpret the statutory
willfulness requirement is significant because it places the anti-
kickback statute in a particular category of highly technical stat-
utes, like tax regulations and antistructuring laws, for which the
Court requires a heightened level of intent. The reasoning is
persuasive enough, considering the facts in Hanlester. Labora-
tory management agreements of the type between Hanlester
and SKBL were common at the time the appellants entered into
the agreement. Although not unlawful per se, evidence of these
agreements suggests the appellants believed their conduct was
entirely legal.93 On these facts, there is a strong argument that
the heightened intent requirement is appropriate to prevent
people from being prosecuted for conduct that is not obviously
unlawful.
C. Starks and Bryan
In the context of less sympathetic facts, the Eleventh Circuit
in United States v. Starks94 held that the anti-kickback statute is
not analogous to the highly complex antistructuring statute, and
that a less stringent standard of intent is appropriate. 95 In up-
holding the guilty verdicts, the court of appeals held that the
trial court did not err when it instructed the jury that the term
"willfully" means that the act was committed with the specific
intent to either "disobey or disregard the law."' 96 This is dis-
tinctly different from the Hanlester standard of willfulness which
requires the prosecution to show the defendant knew of, and
intended to violate, a specific law.97
90. See id. at 144, 146 (citing examples of business persons who intentionally struc-
ture bank deposits in order to reduce the risk of an IRS audit, and taxpayers who
structure cash gifts not to exceed $10,000 in a given tax year).
91. See id. at 145-46.
92. See id. at 149 (citing Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991)).
93. See Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1399, 1401 (9th Cir. 1995).
94. 157 F.3d 833 (11th Cir. 1998).
95. See id. at 838-39.
96. See id. at 837-38.
97. See Hanlester, 51 F.3d at 1400.
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The payment arrangement in Starks, as in Greber and Kats,
was blatantly corrupt. The scheme involved a private drug reha-
bilitation program known as Future Steps, Inc., owned and op-
erated by Andrew Siegal, which paid public employees Angela
Starks and Barbara Henry to refer patients to Future Steps pro-
grams at a local hospital. Starks and Henry were well posi-
tioned to provide referrals; they worked for the Florida
Department of Health and Reproductive Services in a federally-
funded project where they counseled pregnant women about
treatment for drug abuse.98 The supervisor of Starks and Henry
advised them that they were required to report any outside em-
ployment, and that they were not permitted to accept any em-
ployment that could pose a conflict of interest with their work as
state employees. 99 But apparently, cut-backs to federal program
funds, along with a reduction in work hours, generated a sense
of competing imperatives for the two. The admonition from
their supervisor notwithstanding, both Starks and Henry agreed
with a representative of Future Steps to accept payments of
$250 for each patient referral. 100 Future Steps would pay $125 at
the time a referred patient began inpatient treatment, and an
additional $125 after the patient remained with the program for
two weeks. 101 Under the approval of Siegel, Future Steps paid
$3,750 and $3,175 to Starks and Henry, respectively, in cash and
checks.102
Aside from the apparent conflicts of interest, the corrupt na-
ture of this arrangement was clearly revealed in two ways. First,
Starks and Henry insisted on concealing the transactions by tak-
ing payment at locations away from their office, such as in a
parking lot or restaurant.10 3 Such facts alone make it fairly obvi-
ous that Starks and Henry knew that they were behaving inap-
propriately, if not illegally. 1°4 A second more disturbing aspect
of this arrangement is that it corrupted the way in which Starks
and Henry treated pregnant women at the counseling center.
There was clear evidence at trial that both Starks and Henry
98. See Starks, 157 F.3d at 836.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 836-37.
103. See id.
104. A logically consistent, if not persuasive, factual argument could be made that
Starks and Henry were concealing their misdeeds not because they knew their con-
duct was illegal, but to avoid punishment from their employer. If such a defense was
advanced at trial, the guilty verdicts suggest that the jury was not persuaded.
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threatened that women would lose their babies if they did not
obtain counseling from Future Steps. °5 As a result of economic
incentives, Starks and Henry substantially and unjustifiably in-
creased their referrals to Future Steps.10 6
Starks and Siege 10 7 argued on appeal that the trial court erred
by refusing to instruct the jury according to the standard of in-
tent set forth in Ratzlaf.10 8 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals rejected the appellants' contention that the anti-kickback
statute is analogous to the complex financial statutes that re-
quire a heightened level of intent. After comparing the anti-
kickback statute to both the antistructuring laws in Ratzlaf and
firearms licensure requirements in Bryan v. United States, the
court found that giving or taking kickbacks or bribes is more
clearly malum in se than malum prohibitum.109
In Bryan v. United States, the defendant was convicted of
dealing firearms without a federal license. 110 Bryan used "straw
purchasers" to obtain pistols under false pretenses, assured the
straw purchasers that he would file the serial numbers off the
guns, and sold the guns in Brooklyn on street corners fre-
quented by drug dealers.1 ' At trial and during appeal, Bryan
contended the jury should have been instructed that the prose-
cution was required to show that he knew of the relevant legal
prohibitions, and that he specifically intended to violate them." 2
On this point, Bryan relied primarily upon the Supreme Court's
discussion in Ratzlaf of the term "willfully" to interpret the term
105. See Starks, 157 F.3d at 837.
106. See id.
107. Barbara Henry died during the course of the appeal and was dismissed from
the case. See id. at 836 n.2.
108. See id. at 838. Starks and Siegel also argued that the statute was unconstitu-
tionally vague because people of ordinary intelligence could not have ascertained
from a reading of the Safe Harbors whether Starks and Henry were "bona fide em-
ployees" and, thus, exempt from the anti-kickback prohibitions. See id. at 839.
109. See id. (analyzing Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994), and Bryan v.
United States, 524 U.S. 184 (1998)).
110. See Bryan, 524 U.S. at 187. The relevant statutory prohibition reads:
(a) It shall be unlawful -
(1) for any person -
(A) except a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer, to
engage in the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms,
or in the course of such business to ship, transport, or receive any firearm in
interstate or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) (1994).
111. See Bryan, 524 U.S. at 189.
112. See id. at 190.
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as it appears in the penalty provision of the firearm statute. 13
The trial court did not give the requested instruction. Instead,
the court instructed the jury that a person acts "willfully" if he
intends to "disobey or to disregard the law," but he "need not
be aware of the specific law or rule.""1 4
The Bryan Court began its analysis of the term "willfully" by
again observing that it has many meanings, depending on the
context in which it is used.1 15 The Court compared the applica-
tion of the term as used in the firearms statute, the financial
transaction statute from Ratzlaf, and the tax provisions from
Cheek v. United States.116 The Bryan Court makes the distinc-
tion that the federal firearms legislation is unlikely to ensnare
unwary citizens, whereas tax and antistructuring laws often
will. 117 A central point here is that the Court has read a height-
ened scienter requirement into the term "willfully" in cases
where a highly technical law prohibits conduct that does not or-
dinarily appear to be illegal. 118 This was not the case with the
firearms law: it is difficult to argue that dealing firearms without
a license, particularly on street corners and after removing the
serial numbers, would seem lawful to anyone.
Given its assertion that the anti-kickback statute is unlikely to
ensnare individuals engaged in apparently innocent activity, the
Starks court relied on Bryan rather than Ratzlaf to support a less
stringent standard of intent." 9 However, Starks' characteriza-
113. See id. at 189. The relevant penalty provision reads: "whoever ... willfully
violates any other provision of this chapter ... shall be fined under this title, impris-
oned not more than five years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(D) (1994).
114. See id. at 190.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 194 (citing Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199-200 (1991),
and Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 149 (1994)).
117. By recognizing the danger that otherwise innocent persons might be trapped
by complex statutes, the Court touches upon what is an essential point in Supreme
Court opinions on the issue of willfulness. In the context of a highly technical statute,
it would be fundamentally unfair to follow the common law presumption that each
person knows the law. See Cheek, 498 U.S. at 199-200.
118. This analysis is most clearly set forth by then Chief Judge Breyer in a discus-
sion of currency and tax law violations:
Both sets of laws are technical; and both sets of laws sometimes criminalize
conduct that would not strike an ordinary citizen as immoral or likely unlaw-
ful. Thus, both sets of laws may lead to the unfair result of criminally prose-
cuting individuals who subjectively and honestly believe that they have not
acted criminally.
Bryan, 529 U.S. at 195 (citations omitted).
119. See United States v. Starks, 157 F.3d 833, 838 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Bryan,
524 U.S. at 193).
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tion of the anti-kickback statute appears to depend substantially
upon its interpretation of the prohibited activities in that case.12 °
Such logic is unconvincing. The fact that a given statute is em-
ployed in a given case against blatantly corrupt activity does not
make a highly technical statute less technical. The possible ap-
plications of a statute bear no necessary relation to its inherent
complexity. Instead, they relate more to the question of
whether there is a danger of ensnaring apparently innocent ac-
tivity, which is the relevant inquiry on the issue of intent.121
Given the Starks Court's reasoning, one might question how it
would have characterized the anti-kickback statute in a case
with facts more akin to those in Hanlester, where the arrange-
ment in question was common practice.122 None of this should
be taken to suggest that a fraudulent arrangement should be ex-
cused if and because it is common practice. But, as in Hanlester,
a heightened level of intent may be necessary in order to ensure
fairness to unwary defendants.
The foregoing discussion of Greber, Hanlester, and Starks pro-
vides a view of the different standards of intent that may apply
to any given compensation arrangement, and shows that none of
these standards focus adequately on the effects of a given com-
pensation arrangement on cost and quality. The following dis-
cussion of gainsharing arrangements and disease management
programs offers two examples of how the anti-kickback statute
impacts two popular types of compensation arrangements.
D. Gainsharing Arrangements and Disease
Management Programs
Gainsharing and disease management programs ("DMP") re-
present the very complex types of arrangements that have been
developed in response to market pressures to reduce costs with-
out compromising quality. While both types of arrangements in-
volve the moral hazard of inappropriate utilization,
compensation incentives are typically contingent upon clinical
outcomes. An essential problem is that an intent-based statute
is poorly suited to segregate arrangements that compromise
cost-effectiveness from those that promote it. For this reason,
120. See id. at 838 (making the point that the kickback arrangement in Starks was
clearly malum in se rather than malum prohibitum).
121. See id.; see also Bryan, 524 U.S. at 194 (stating it was "[t]he danger of convict-
ing individuals engaged in apparently innocent activity that motivated our decisions in
the tax cases and Ratziaf .... ").
122. See Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1399, 1401 (9th Cir. 1995).
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the anti-kickback statute is so inclusive as to be self-defeating in
that it prohibits or discourages arrangements that would other-
wise advance the legislative intent of promoting cost-effective
health care.1 23
Gainsharing, in its most basic form, is a compensation ar-
rangement in which a hospital shares with a physician a portion
of the savings in patient care costs that are attributable, at least
in part, to the physician's efforts.124 Gainsharing arrangements
have become a popular strategy to align physician incentives
with hospitals' need to control costs under prospective payment
systems. These arrangements are based on the assumption that
physicians have significant control over treatment costs, and are
more likely to develop cost-effective methods if given financial
incentives to do so. As a precaution, many gainsharing arrange-
ments limit compensation to the fair market value of the physi-
cian's services and include a requirement that cost reduction
measures not diminish the quality of patient care.125
Notwithstanding such protective measures, gainsharing ar-
rangements are uniformly condemned by the OIG.126  The
OIG's primary legal contention is that gainsharing arrangements
violate the civil money penalty provisions of the Social Security
Act, which prohibit a hospital from directly or indirectly paying
a physician to reduce or limit services to a Medicare or Medicaid
patient under that physician's care. 27 In this analysis, however,
the OIG also notes that gainsharing arrangements may violate
the anti-kickback statute.128  The apparent rationale is that
under gainsharing, physicians are compensated as an induce-
ment to make referrals to the hospital. It appears to be immate-
rial that the intent is to induce less costly referrals; again, the
123. Cf SUNSTEIN, supra note 21, at 271 (suggesting a regulation is self-defeating
if the unintended consequences negate the intended ones).
124. See Special Advisory Bulletin on Gainsharing Arrangements and CMPs for
Hospital Payments to Physicians to Reduce or Limit Services to Beneficiaries, 64 Fed.
Reg. 37,985, 37,986 (1999).
125. See id.
126. It is worth noting that the Internal Revenue Service has taken a different
view. In a private letter ruling, the IRS approved a gainsharing arrangement in which
a hospital agreed to compensate physicians who improve services and save money
with a portion of the cost savings. See IRS OKs Gainsharing Arrangement in Unre-
leased Letter Ruling, TAX NoTEs TODAY, July 6, 1999, at 128.
127. See Special Advisory Bulletin on Gainsharing Arrangements and CMPs for
Hospital Payments to Physicians to Reduce or Limit Services to Beneficiaries, 64 Fed.
Reg. 37,985, 37,986 (1999) (citing Social Security Act § 1128A(b)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320a-7a(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1997)).
128. See id. at 37,986 n.1.
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gravamen of the offense is inducement. The anti-kickback
prohibitions do not require that the arrangement in question in-
crease costs. 129 Clearly, an outcomes-based standard would
more readily accommodate gainsharing arrangements that en-
hance cost-effectiveness.
Similarly, disease management programs have recently be-
come popular among pharmaceutical companies as a way to
compete with other manufacturers for market share and to
make their products more attractive to managed care organiza-
tions.13° This is due in large part to pressures from managed
care organizations to share some of the financial risk of
pharmacotherapy. In essence, managed care organizations are
challenging pharmaceutical companies to make good on their
claims that certain chronic disorders, such as arthritis, asthma,
diabetes, and hypertension, can be treated more cost-effectively
with carefully managed treatment protocols.13'
Though there is not uniformity among DMPs, typical arrange-
ments include an agreement by a drug manufacturer to provide
services to a managed care organization, such as developing
clinical information systems, conducting education programs for
physicians and patients, or providing case managers for a given
condition or set of conditions. 32 The DMP will usually bear
some of the financial risk of treatment. One method of risk-
sharing is simply to work on a capitated basis. Another makes
payment for disease management services contingent upon im-
proved clinical outcomes, with the manufacturer agreeing to
share in any financial losses if the program reduces cost-effec-
tiveness. This outcomes-driven method of compensation places
the financial risk on the parties providing the services, which en-
courages DMPs to develop cost-effective innovations.1 33
Disease management programs are problematic under the
anti-kickback statute to the extent that a pharmaceutical com-
pany, through a DMP, offers remuneration in the form of man-
agement services, specialty physician services, or price discounts
129. See United States v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 874
F.2d 20, 32 n.21 (1st Cir. 1989).
130. See Arnold J. Rosoff, The Changing Face of Pharmacy Benefits Management:
Information Technology Pursues a Grand Mission, 42 ST. Louis U. L. J. 1, 16 (1998);
see also Mark Learn, Comment, Applying Medicare and Medicaid Anti-Kickback
Laws to Disease Management Programs: Ramifications for the Pharmaceutical Indus-
try and a Regulatory Proposal, 69 TEMP. L. Ruv. 245, 248 (1996).
131. See Learn, supra note 130, at 250; see also Rosoff, supra note 130, at 16.
132. See Learn, supra note 130, at 250.
133. See Rosoff, supra note 130, at 16.
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in order to induce increased prescriptions of its drugs. The busi-
ness objectives of pharmaceutical manufacturers are fairly obvi-
ous. The fact that some of the largest pharmaceutical companies
have paid billions of dollars to acquire pharmacy benefit man-
agement companies, the leaders in developing DMPs, suggests
that pharmaceutical companies see great market potential in
DMPs. 34 However, it is also clear that a successful DMP may
reduce costs and improve clinical outcomes. 35 These outcomes
notwithstanding, DMPs rest on uncertain ground.
In order to reduce the risk of prosecution under the anti-kick-
back statute, the DMP must fit as closely as possible within the
terms of at least one of four safe harbors: personal services
agreements, referral services, and price reductions to two sub-
sets of managed care plans. 36 While a detailed discussion of the
applicable safe harbors goes beyond the scope of this discussion,
it is worth summarizing. The safe harbor for personal service
contracts protects payments to a DMP in exchange for services,
as long as seven conditions are met.137 Given that DMPs will
often charge according to patient volume, some changes in bill-
ing practices may be necessary in order to comply with the fifth
condition: that aggregate compensation be set in advance in an
amount that reflects fair market value, and does not take into
account the value or volume of referrals. 138
134. See Learn, supra note 130, at 247 & n.11 (citations omitted).
135. See Rosoff, supra note 130, at 16-17.
136. See 42 C.F.R. §1001.952(d) (1999), as amended by 64 Fed. Reg. 63,504, 63,551
(1999) (safe harbor for personal services and managment contracts); 42 C.F.R.
§1001.952(f (1999), as amended by 64 Fed. Reg. 63,504, 63,551 (1999) (safe harbor for
referral services); 64 Fed. Reg. 63,504, 63,515 (1999) (codified at 42 C.F.R.
§1001.952(t)) (safe harbor for price reductions offered to eligible managed care orga-
nizations); 64 Fed. Reg. 63,504, 63,515 (1999) (codified at 42 C.F.R. §1001.952(u))
(safe harbor for price reductions offered by contractors with substantial financial risk
to managed care organizations). Cf. Learn, supra note 130, at 262-67 (discussing safe
harbors for personal service contracts, warranties, and referral services).
137. The seven standards for the personal services and managment contracts safe
harbor are: (1) the agreement must be in writing and signed by the parties; (2) the
agreement must specify the services to be rendered; (3) the agreement must specify
the schedule, precise length, and exact charge for any part-time or periodic services;
(4) the agreement must be for a term of no less than one year; (5) the compensation
to be paid must be set in advance, reflect fair market value, and not take into account
the value of referrals payable under Medicare or Medicaid; (6) the agreement must
not involve the counseling or promotion of any activity that violates State or Federal
law; (7) the aggregate services do not exceed those which are reasonably necessary to
accomplish their purpose. 42 C.F.R. §1001.952(d) (1999), as amended by 64 Fed. Reg.
63,504, 63,551 (1999).
138. See id. § 1001.952(d)(5).
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Under the safe harbor for referral services, remuneration
does not include any payment or exchange of anything of value
between the referring entity and the participant in the referral
service, if four conditions are met. 139 The second condition de-
mands that payments to a referral service be assessed equally
among participants, and be based on the cost of operating the
referral service, not on the value or volume of service. 140 This
requirement becomes a problem when a participating physician
prescribes pharmaceuticals sold or manufactured by a corpora-
tion with an interest in the DMP. Each prescription ordered by
a participating physician may be interpreted as a form of remu-
neration to the referring DMP. Such remuneration bears no re-
lation to the cost of operating the DMP, and lacks uniformity
among participating physicians.
Two new safe harbors cover price reductions to "eligible man-
aged care organizations"'' and "qualified managed care
plans,"'14 2 on the condition that certain standards are met. Safe
139. The requirements for the safe harbor for referral services are: (1) the referral
service does not exclude as a participant in the referral service any person or entity
(such as a physician or group practice) who meets the requirements for participation;
(2) payments made by participants to the referral service must be assessed and col-
lected equally from all participants, and be based upon the cost of operating the refer-
ral service, and not on the volume or value of referrals; (3) the referral service may
not impose any requirements on the manner in which the participant provides ser-
vices to a referred person, except that the referral service may require that the partici-
pant charges referred persons no more than it charges other persons; (4) the referral
service discloses to each person seeking a referral certain information about how the
referral service selects or excludes participants from the referrals service, and the na-
ture of any relationship between the referral service and the participant. See id.
§ 1001.952(f).
140. See id. § 1001.952(f)(2).
141. See 64 Fed. Reg. 63,504, 63,515 (1999) (codified at 42 C.F.R. §1001.952(t)).
The three standards for the safe harbor for price reductions to eligible managed care
organizations are: (1) the managed care organization and the contractor offering dis-
counts must have a written agreement that specifies the items and services covered, is
for a period of at least one year, and places specific limits on when the contractor can
directly bill a federal health care program for services under the contract; (2) neither
party to the agreement shall give or receive remuneration to induce referrals not cov-
ered by the agreement for which payment may be made by a federal health care
program; (3) neither party to the agreement shall shift the financial burden of the
agreement to a federal health care program. See id. at 71,317 (codified at 42 C.F.R.
§ 1001.952(t)(1)(i)).
142. See id. at 53,515 (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(u)). The five standards for
qualified managed care plans are: (1) the agreement must be in writing and signed by
the parties, specify the items and services covered, be for a period of at least one year,
include participation in a quality assurance program, and specify a method of deter-
mining what is commercially reasonable; (2) any investment interest that the contrac-
tor has in the managed care plan must meet certain complex criteria; (3) the
contractor must have a substantial financial risk in the cost or utilization of services it
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harbors for price reductions are potentially significant because a
central purpose of DMPs is to develop cost-effective treatments
that may also be accompanied by price reductions. 43 A moder-
ately inclusive safe harbor could eliminate substantial anti-kick-
back problems. The new safe harbors do not provide such wide
relief.
The applicability of the price reduction safe harbors is limited
to a narrow subset of managed care providers. The definitions
of "eligible managed care organization' 1 44 and "qualified man-
aged care plan"'145 are sufficiently restrictive to exclude many
providers that might logically participate in a DMP. For exam-
ple, a managed care organization is not "qualified" for the safe
harbor for contractors with a substantial financial risk if it serves
a patient base where more than 50 percent are Medicare benefi-
ciaries.146 This would likely exclude a managed care organiza-
tion that serves a retired population. However, the same
managed care program would likely qualify for the safe harbor
for "eligible" managed care organizations if it served the elderly
under the Programs For All Inclusive Care For The Elderly. 47
These complex distinctions may serve some purpose, but they
provides; (4) for items and services reimbursable by a federal health care program, a
qualified managed care plan must, with some exceptions, submit claims directly to the
federal health care program, pursuant to a reassignment agreement, and payments to
contractors for items and services reimbursed by a federal health care program must
be identical to the payment arrangements for the same items or services provided
when not reimbursable by a federal health care program; (5) neither party gives or
receives remuneration to induce referrals, other than for items and services covered
by the arrangement, for which payment may be made by a federal health care pro-
gram, and neither party shall shift the financial burden to increase the payments
claimed from a federal health care program. See id. (codified at 42 C.F.R.
§ 1001.952(u)(1)(i)).
143. See Rosoff, supra note 130, 16-17.
144. An "eligible managed care organization" is defined as: (1) a HMO or CMP
with a risk or cost-based contract; (2) any Medicare Part C health plan that receives a
capitated payment from Medicare, and has its cost sharing approved by HCFA; (3)
Medicaid managed care organizations; (4) health plans that provide services to Medi-
caid enrollees under a risk-based contract with a state agency; (5) Programs For All
Inclusive Care For The Elderly (PACE); (6) a federally qualified HMO. See 64 Fed.
Reg. 63,504, 63,515 (1999) (codified at 42 C.F.R. §1001.952(t)(2)(ii)).
145. A "qualified managed care plan" is defined as one that: (1) offers a compre-
hensive range of services; (2) provides a utilization and quality assurance program
that promotes the coordination of care and prevents inappropriate utilization, and
includes grievance procedures and protections against patient financial liability be-
yond copayments and deductibles; and (3) covers a beneficiary population of which
no more than 10 percent, or up to 50 percent under specific circumstances, are Medi-
care beneficiaries. See id. (codified at 42 C.F.R. §1001.952(u)(2)(vi)).
146. See id. (codified at 42 C.F.R. §1001.952(u)(2)(vi)(C)(2)).
147. See id. (codified at 42 C.F.R. §1001.952(t)(2)(ii)(E)).
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have no apparent connection to the issue of whether a given
DMP increases or decreases cost-effectiveness.
From this brief discussion, it is clear that DMPs do not fit
neatly within any safe harbor. The result is that there will often
be some risk of prosecution, despite the complexity of efforts to
comply. The unfortunate irony is that many of these legally
questionable arrangements help to reduce costs and improve
health outcomes.
III. THE CASE FOR A RULE OF REASON ANALYSIS
The preceding review of the most significant cases on the is-
sue of intent, and the examples of gainsharing and disease man-
agement programs, provides a clear indication that the anti-
kickback statute, as currently written and interpreted, creates
unnecessary tension between governmental and private objec-
tives. The government's stated intent in enacting the anti-kick-
back statute is to save costs and prevent inappropriate
utilization.148 On the other hand, providers and payers in the
private market are under serious pressure to develop cost-effec-
tive health care delivery systems. In pursuing its own objectives,
the government insists that the laws and regulations must leave
room for broad prosecutorial discretion. 49 And, not surpris-
ingly, commentators argue that current regulations unduly re-
strict the implementation of innovative delivery systems that
may be more cost-effective. 5 °
148. See supra text accompanying notes 24-26.
149. This tendency is apparent in OIG statements regarding both advisory opin-
ions and safe harbors. Regarding the risk of prosecution for compensation arrange-
ments that do not fit completely within a safe harbor, the OIG states:
[T]he degree of risk depends on an evaluation of the many factors which are
part of the decision-making process regarding case selection for investigation
and prosecution .... We do not believe the Medicare and Medicaid pro-
grams would be properly served if we assured protection in all instances of
'substantial compliance,' 'technical violations,' or 'de minimis' payments.
Unfortunately, these are vague concepts, subject to differing interpreta-
tions.... The OIG therefore declines to adopt these concepts.
56 Fed. Reg. 35,952 (1991).
In declining to issue model advisory opinions the OIG states:
[I]t is unlikely that a party could precisely duplicate an approved arrange-
ment; invariably, there would be differences, some of which might be signifi-
cant. Sanction authorities impose liability based on acts by specific people in
particular factual circumstances. Thus, a particular arrangement may be le-
gal with respect to one party, but not with respect to another.
Issuance of Advisory Opinions by the OIG, 63 Fed. Reg. 38,311, 38,314 (1998) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1008).
150. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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While the government's campaign against inappropriate utili-
zation and unnecessary costs is often in tension with the goal of
private organizations to enhance revenue, these objectives are
not necessarily incompatible. The friction between governmen-
tal and private imperatives has little to do with any fundamental
differences between governmental interests and mainstream pri-
vate interests. 151 There will always be a temptation for some
health care organizations to seek profits through inappropriate
utilization, and the government has a clear and unassailable in-
terest in eliminating such abuses. But most organizations, both
for-profit and nonprofit, recognize that, in the long-term, the
most effective way to enhance revenue is to satisfy consumer
demand for cost-effective care. 52 And, unintended conse-
quences aside, the government has expressed no interest in
preventing cost-effective care.
The tension between the government and private health care
lies more at the margins, where the innovations fall into the gray
zone of legal uncertainty. Two factors contribute to this tension.
First, the lack of consensus among the courts makes it difficult
to anticipate how government agencies or the courts will treat a
given business arrangement, particularly in jurisdictions that
have not recently ruled on the issue of willfulness. Second, and
more fundamentally, the anti-kickback statute does not distin-
guish between compensation arrangements that increase costs
or compromise patient care and arrangements that have no per-
nicious effects.153 The anti-kickback statute flatly prohibits all
arrangements involving remuneration in connection with an in-
tent to induce referrals, regardless of the arrangement's actual
ethical and economic effects. 154
As the statute is currently written and interpreted, the only
real distinction by the courts between different types of compen-
sation arrangements relates to proof requirements, not the sub-
stance of the prohibited conduct. Under the law, an
arrangement that enhances patient care and reduces costs is as
151. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
152. This assumes a functioning market where consumers have ready access to
information regarding cost and quality. When consumers lack such information, mar-
ket failure may result, and government intervention may be necessary to correct an
information imbalance. See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the
Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 102-03 (1995).
153. See United States v. Bay State Ambulance and Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 874
F.2d 20, 32 n.21 (1st Cir. 1989).
154. See id.
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illegal as an arrangement that grossly compromises the physi-
cian's professional relationship with patients. The main differ-
ence between the two is that it is far easier to prove unlawful
intent in one instance than it is in the other. Cases like Starks
exemplify this point, making it difficult to argue that the defend-
ants did not know the conduct in question was wrong even
under a more exacting standard of intent (as in Hanlester).
The fact that there is no formal legal distinction between po-
tentially beneficial and obviously corrupt arrangements is miti-
gated to some degree by the government's assurance that it is
likely to prosecute anti-kickback violations only if they involve a
serious breach of a physician's obligations to patients. 55 That is,
there must be a statutory violation plus some indication that the
physician's fiduciary duties are likely to be compromised. 156 But
this unwritten assurance does nothing to define precisely what
this "plus" factor must be; nor does it offer any legal certainty
for those who wish to remain within the letter of the law rather
than merely avoid prosecution.
It is clear that the price for the simplicity of an all-inclusive
prohibition is that the statute discourages or prevents many po-
tentially beneficial compensation arrangements. 157 This sacrifice
is not necessary. The tension between private and governmental
interests could be greatly reduced, and public well-being corre-
spondingly enhanced, if the applicable legal standard explicitly
accounted for the distinction between those compensation ar-
rangements that are obviously corrupt and those that are more
defensible.
Such a distinction can be drawn by borrowing from antitrust
law, where there is a conceptual difference between conduct
treated as a per se violation and conduct that is subject to a rule
of reason. Under the latter analysis, courts and regulators bal-
ance the anticompetitive impact of a given arrangement or prac-
tice against the procompetitive efficiencies.
A. Rule of Reason
The statutory framework of federal antitrust law consists of
the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Com-
155. See AHLA, supra note 7, at 17.
156. See id. at 24.
157. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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mission Act. 158 The rule of reason is the product of common law
interpretations of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Taken literally,
the Sherman Act would prohibit every contract, combination, or
conspiracy in restraint of interstate or foreign trade.159 Early
Supreme Court decisions interpreted the word "every" literally,
and imposed broad prohibitions. In United States v. Trans-Mis-
souri Freight Ass'n,160 the Court held that a price fixing agree-
ment between railroad companies violated the Sherman Act,
notwithstanding the argument that prices as set were not exces-
sive and that the arrangement was necessary to ensure business
stability. The Court stated the "plain and ordinary meaning" of
the statute does not confine the prohibitions to only those re-
straints of trade that are unreasonable. 161
However, in Standard Oil Co. v. United States,1 62 the Court
developed a more nuanced interpretation of the statute that dis-
tinguished reasonable and unreasonable restraints of trade.
Standard Oil Company developed and exercised monopolistic
power over a substantial portion of the production, transporta-
tion and sale of petroleum products in the United States. 163 It
achieved this power largely by conspiring with and acquiring
competing companies to limit competition.' 64
In examining Standard Oil's conduct under the Sherman Act,
the Court set forth its first articulation of what is now known as
the rule of reason. Although the Court ordered Standard Oil to
158. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits all contracts, combinations, and con-
spiracies in restraint of interstate or foreign trade. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolies, attempts to monopolize, and
conspiracies to monopolize. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
Section 2 of the Clayton Act, commonly known as the Robinson-Patman Act, pro-
hibits price discrimination for goods sold in interstate commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 13
(1994).
Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers and acquisitions that may substan-
tially reduce competition or tend to create a monopoly. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994 & Supp.
1998).
Section 5 of The Federal Trade Commission Act gives authority to the Federal
Trade Commission to challenge unfair or deceptive trade practices. 15 U.S.C. § 45
(1994).
159. Section 1 of the Sherman Act reads: "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1994).
160. 166 U.S. 290, 330-31 (1897).
161. Id. at 328.
162. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
163. See id. at 71.
164. See id. at 56-60
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spin off its various subsidiaries, the Court determined that it
would be unreasonable and against the presumed legislative in-
tent to adopt a literal understanding of the word "every" as
found in section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Court, thus, ex-
amined the Sherman Act within the context of the preceding
common law on restraint. The Court inferred that the law was
written broadly in order to include the different types of con-
tracts and combinations that would emerge in an evolving econ-
omy, but that the legislative intent was to prohibit only those
arrangements which imposed an undue restraint on trade. 65 In
order to distinguish between permissible and impermissible re-
straints, the Court adopted a "rule of reason" to examine the
direct and indirect effects of a particular arrangement. 166
In Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,1 67 the Court fur-
ther developed the doctrine of the rule of reason. In this case,
the Court approved an agreement between members of the Chi-
cago Board of Trade which limited trading during off-market
hours. The agreement prohibited members from purchasing or
offering to purchase grain "to arrive" between the time of the
closing bids on one day and opening bids the next day at a price
other than the last closing bid.168 In approving this arrange-
ment, the Court distinguished between restraints that suppress
and those that promote competition. 169 In order to determine
the actual or probable effect of a given restraint, the Court em-
phasized that it would look to the particular facts and the intent
of the parties. The Court noted that, while good intent will not
save an anticompetitive trade restraint, knowledge of the par-
ties' intent may help the Court predict the likely consequences
of the arrangement. 7 0
165. See id.
166. See id. at 66.
167. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
168. See id. at 237.
169. The Court set forth a concise formulation of the rule of reason: "The true
test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and per-
haps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even
destroy competition." Id. at 238.
170. The Court stated:
[T]he court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to
which the restraint is applied; ... The history of the restraint, the evil be-
lieved to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or
end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because good
intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but
... knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict
consequences.
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This formulation of the rule of reason accommodates the
common purpose of all commercial agreements-to regulate
trade between parties and, thereby, to restrain trade to some
degree. 171 By acknowledging this fact and applying the rule of
reason, the Court in Chicago Board of Trade avoided an unrea-
sonable result that a strict reading of the Sherman Act would
create. Because the trading restrictions were on balance
procompetitive, the Court held the restraints to be reasonable
and permissible. 72 This method weighs the benefits of a given
practice, in contrast to the per se rule.
B. Per Se Rule
Under the per se rule, certain categories of business conduct
are judged by the courts to be so consistently anticompetitive
that they are categorically prohibited without close examination
of the precise harms or business. 73 This generalization reflects a
judgment by the courts that the anticompetitive effects of cer-
tain types of business arrangements consistently outweigh any
procompetitive benefits and should, therefore, be prohibited. 174
The per se rule permits a degree of business certainty and litiga-
tion efficiency that would not be possible if the courts had to
evaluate each individual business arrangement. The price for
this efficiency is that some arrangements are summarily invali-
dated, though closer examination might show that they are rea-
sonable in a particular case. 75 The per se rule also reflects a
judgment that this does not occur frequently enough to justify
the time and expense necessary to individually evaluate each
business arrangement. 176 Several types of practices are judged
Id. at 238.
171. See id. at 237.
172. See id. at 240.
173. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1997) (cit-
ing Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
174. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 351 n.23 (1982)
(citing United States v. Socony-Vacum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226 n.59 (1940)
("Whatever economic justification particular price-fixing agreements may be thought
to have, the law does not permit an inquiry into their reasonableness. They are all
banned because of their actual or potential threat to the central nervous system of the
economy.").
175. See Maricopa County, 457 U.S. at 344 & n.16 (citing United States v. Topco
Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609 (1972)).
176. See Continental TV., 433 U.S. at 50 n.16.
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under the per se rule, including tying arrangements, 77 boy-
cotts, 178 and horizontal price fixing. 79
The per se rule was set forth in United States v. Trenton Pot-
teries Co., 80 which involved a group of individuals and corpora-
tions that together controlled over eighty percent of the
manufacture and distribution of sanitary pottery for use in bath-
rooms and lavatories in the United States. The defendants were
convicted in district court of agreeing to (1) fix prices and (2)
limit sales to "legitimate jobbers." The trial court instructed the
jury that such agreements were, in and of themselves, unreason-
able restraints on trade, and that if the jury found that the par-
ties participated in such agreements, it could return guilty
verdicts without considering whether prices were fixed at rea-
sonable levels or whether sales were actually restricted to "legit-
imate jobbers." The Second Circuit reversed their convictions.
One of the issues before the Supreme Court was whether the
trial court should have allowed the jury to determine whether
the agreements constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade.' 81
The Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly with-
drew from the jury the question of whether the alleged re-
straints were unreasonable. 82 In finding the agreements per se
unlawful, the Court stated that the purpose of every price-fixing
agreement is to eliminate competition, and that agreements
which create such power, whether reasonably exercised or not,
are unlawful per se.1 83
177. The per se rule against tying arrangements was first announced in Interna-
tional Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947). The Court has since limited
the rule to circumstances where a purchaser of the tying product is effectively forced
to purchase a tied product. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2
(1984) (approving an exclusive services contract between an anesthesiologist group
and a hospital because there was no evidence that any patient expressed a desire to
use any other anesthesiologist).
178. See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (disap-
proving an agreement among independent trial lawyers to withhold services until the
compensation for appointed cases was increased).
179. See Maricopa County, 457 U.S. at 348-55 (disapproving an agreement setting
price caps for certain procedures); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S.
392 (1927).
180. 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
181. See id. at 394-95.
182. See id. at 401.
183. See id. at 371.
The power to fix prices, whether reasonably exercised or not, involves power
to control the market and to fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices. . .
Agreements which create such potential power may well be held to be in
themselves unreasonable or unlawful restraints, without the necessity of
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This application of the per se rule is fairly representative in
that it reflects that a category of practices lacks any positive net
social utility. Consequently, such practices are prohibited.
Notwithstanding the differences between the rule of reason
and the per se rule, the objective of both is to prevent anticom-
petitive business practices while permitting those that are on
balance procompetitive. Under both rules, courts will examine
a given arrangement to the extent necessary to determine with
reasonable certainty whether the competitive efficiencies out-
weigh the anticompetitive effects. The primary difference be-
tween these rules lies in how far the courts must look to make
the necessary determination. 184 Under the per se rule, courts
must look only far enough to determine whether the practice in
question falls into one of the prohibited categories. In contrast,
under the rule of reason, courts must examine the particular
competitive efficiencies. But the common objective of both is to
maximize market efficiencies and, thereby, advance net social
utility.185
The rule of reason/per se distinction allows courts to reasona-
bly interpret and apply the very broad prohibitions of the Sher-
man Act. Similar conceptual distinctions should be employed
under the anti-kickback statute in order to achieve the original
legislative intent of preventing inappropriate utilization and the
consequent increases in cost and compromises in quality.
C. An Anti-Kickback Rule of Reason
The anti-kickback statute and the Sherman Act contain simi-
larities in that they both impose very broad prohibitions and ap-
ply to a wide range of business practices, some of which appear
on their face corrupt and others which are more defensible on
the basis of social utility. For example, the Chicago Board of
Trade's decision to limit trading during off-market hours was
held to be reasonable, 86 even though it was a restraint of trade,
minute inquiry whether a particular price is reasonable or unreasonable as
fixed ....
See id. at 397.
184. Craig D. Bachman, Legal Analysis of Health Care Antitrust Issues: What
Rules Apply?- Per Se Offenses, in ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE ENFORCEMENT &
ANALYSIS, at 3, 7 (M. Elizabeth Gee ed., 1992).
185. "[T]he per se rules ... are.., directed to the protection of the public welfare;
they are complementary to, and in no way inconsistent with, the rule of reason."
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 621 (1972) (Burger, J., dissenting).
186. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 240 (1918).
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but the exclusionary practices in Standard Oil were impermissi-
ble. 187 Similarly, the anti-kickback statute reaches both poten-
tially beneficial disease management programs, as well as
obviously corrupt bribery and kickback schemes. From a cost-
benefit perspective, arrangements likely to produce some net so-
cial utility should be treated differently than those that will not.
A rule of reason in the anti-kickback context would permit clear
legal distinctions between such practices that are not now ex-
plicit in the statute or judicial interpretations.
Both the anti-kickback statute and the Sherman Act are in-
tended to promote efficiency. Under the Sherman Act, the
Court uses the rule of reason to balance competitive and an-
ticompetitive effects.1 88 The assumption here is that a competi-
tive market will most efficiently advance the public welfare.1 89
The legislative history of the anti-kickback statute lists cost and
quality as significant concerns.1 90 An underlying point of the
anti-kickback statute is to prohibit compensation arrangements
that contain economic incentives to inappropriately utilize
health care resources. Legislative intent notwithstanding,
neither the statute nor the courts recognize inappropriate utili-
zation, and the accompanying cost increases or decreases in
quality, as necessary elements of the offense.' 9' Thus, a rule of
reason focusing on cost and quality would be more consistent
with the original legislative intent than current judicial interpre-
tations of the statute.
An additional similarity between the business practices gov-
erned by the anti-kickback statute and the Sherman Act is that
under either statute, the parties' intent provides an indication of
the likely results of a given business arrangement. The observa-
tion here is simple: if the parties have a corrupt intent, then the
effects are likely to be corrupt. However, the statutes also differ
on the issue of intent. Under the Sherman Act, courts look to
party intent as only one factor influencing procompetitive or an-
ticompetitive results.192 Intent itself is not controlling. On the
other hand, under the anti-kickback statute, the parties' intent is
187. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 55-60 (1911).
188. See supra note 170.
189. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 24-26 and accompanying text.
191. See United States v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 874
F.2d 20, 33 n.21 (1st Cir. 1989).
192. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
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controlling, regardless of cost or quality.193 Here, too, a rule of
reason could be usefully employed to widen the focus of courts
to include cost and quality.
If social utility is an objective of the anti-kickback statute,
then there are persuasive arguments for the adoption of a rule
of reason. As outlined above, a rule of reason would permit
distinctions between different types of business activity. It
would encourage an explicit examination of the efficiencies in-
volved in a given arrangement, and it would force the courts and
regulators to focus more carefully on issues of cost and quality.
A rule of reason should be statutorily enacted in order to offer
clarity to market participants and to facilitate the legislative in-
tent. The OIG's promise not to challenge a compensation ar-
rangement unless it is likely to produce increased costs and
compromise care is insufficient. 194 OIG's adherence to the
Greber "one purpose" rule speaks for more articulately than
clearly any informal assurance of prosecutorial moderation.
Without a legislatively enacted rule of reason, there is no assur-
ance that reason will prevail in any given case.
Consistent with antitrust jurisprudence, 195 the rule of reason
should be available as an affirmative defense if the arrangement
fits within certain parameters. Compensation arrangements that
unnecessarily compromise care or increase costs without corre-
sponding improvements in clinical outcomes would be treated as
illegal per se. However, it will often be a complex task to deter-
mine whether a given arrangement is appropriately judged
under a rule of reason, and, if so, whether the arrangement
passes muster. The following discussion examines some of the
variables involved in a rule of reason, cost-benefit analysis, and
then for an example, briefly considers how gainsharing arrange-
ments and disease management programs would be evaluated
under a rule of reason.
IV. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND A RULE OF REASON
The rule of reason presumes a cost-benefit analysis whereby
the courts and government agencies try to ascertain whether a
given business practice increases or decreases net social utility.
193. See Bay State Ambulance, 874 F.2d at 33 n.21.
194. See AHLA, supra note 7, at 17.
195. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Prof'1 Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978)
(rejecting the defense that a prohibition against competitive bidding was justified
under the rule of reason).
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In an antitrust case, this involves a comparison of competitive
and anticompetitive effects. Although the measurement of mar-
ket impact is neither simple nor precise, the direct comparison
of competitive and anticompetitive effects is more straightfor-
ward than a cost-benefit analysis under an anti-kickback rule of
reason.
A. Cost and Quality Variables
A cost-benefit analysis in health care typically requires the
balancing of economic costs against the quality of clinical out-
comes.196 Two tasks present themselves in this comparison.
First, the quality of health outcomes for a given type of treat-
ment must be accurately measured. The ability of researchers to
measure clinical outcomes and patient satisfaction is well devel-
oped and has advanced substantially since the 1970s. 97
The second task is more complex and requires that health out-
comes for a given treatment be measured against economic
costs. There are two complicating factors involved in any at-
tempt to balance the cost of treatment against the quality of
clinical outcomes. First, marginal costs and quality of clinical
outcomes will often vary with time and units of patient care de-
livered. 198 The result of this variability between cost and quality
is that there will very rarely be a straight line ratio where costs
or quality go up or down at a constant rate. Rather, the ratio
may change over time and with volume. For instance, marginal
costs may decrease and quality may improve to a certain level of
productivity, beyond which marginal costs may begin to in-
crease.199 One reason for this is that economies of scale relating
to fixed and variable costs will usually permit a higher quantity
of patient care to be delivered at a lower cost per unit than a
smaller quantity.200 The practical implication of this is that no
compensation arrangement can be judged out of context. Con-
sideration must be given to the type and quantity of care deliv-
ered under any given compensation arrangement.
196. See generally Alice G. Gosfield, Value Purchasing in Medicare Law: Precur-
sor to Health Reform, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 169 (1994).
197. See Troyen A. Brennan, The Role of Regulation in Quality Improvement, 76
MILBANK QUARTERLY 709 (1998).
198. See generally Hal R. Varian, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMIcs: A MODERN
APPROACH 351-2 (4th ed. 1996) (discussing marginal and variable costs).
199. See id.
200. See id. at 352 (the average cost curve will initially fall with increased produc-
tion because of a corresponding decrease in fixed costs per unit).
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The second complicating factor in balancing health care costs
and quality is that in many instances it will be necessary to di-
rectly compare a given amount or marginal change in one
against a given amount or marginal change in the other. The
difficulty with this task is that health and money have qualita-
tively different values.2 0 1 A bundle of health care is not the
same as a bundle of money. An essential difference between
the valuations of money and health is that health is an intrinsic
good with a value of its own, whereas money is an instrumental
good, having value only insofar as it serves other ends. 2  For
this reason, money and health outcomes cannot be easily or cat-
egorically measured one against the other as readily as, say, the
monetary value of competitive and anticompetitive effects.
One practical manifestation of this difference is that people
think differently about their health than they do about money.
Losing or regaining your health is not the same as losing or ac-
quiring money, and it would be an obvious over-simplification
to treat them as representing just more or less of the same
thing.20 3 Health and money are not the same, and it is not possi-
ble to value both along a single metric without distorting or di-
minishing substantial characteristics of both.2° In this sense,
health and money are incommensurable goods.20 5
Much could be said about incommensurability, but for present
purposes, the significant point is that without a common unit of
measure, it is impossible to develop an algorithm to direct
meaningful choices between health and money.2°6 For this rea-
son, rational choices between costs and quality will necessarily
be practical, rather than theoretical or abstract.20 7 The goal is to
develop a balance that minimizes the adverse effects on both
costs and quality. This raises the question about the relative
weights cost and quality should be assigned. Though a discus-
sion of this normative choice goes well beyond the scope of this
201. See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 21, at 72-3 (1997) (discussing different
types of valuation with a particular focus on money).
202. See id. at 72 (distinguishing between intrinsic and instrumental goods).
203. See id. (contrasting the loss of a friend, an intrinsic good, with the loss of
money, an instrumental good).
204. See id. at 80 (naming money as an example of a single metric, where one
amount can easily be measured against another).
205. See id. (incommensurability occurs when "relevant goods cannot be aligned
along a single metric without doing violence to our considered judgments about how
these goods are best characterized.") Id.
206. See id. at 101.
207. See id.
2000]
39
Aspinwall: The Anti-Kickback Statute Standard(s) of Intent: The Case for a R
Published by LAW eCommons, 2000
Annals of Health Law
article, it is worth noting that some practical agreement already
exists about the broad parameters. For example, most would
agree that a substantial improvement in the prevention or treat-
ment of strokes would be worth a substantial amount of
money-even without taking into account improvements in pa-
tients' earning potential. And most would agree that a slight
reduction in the rate of the common cold would not be worth
substantial increases in health care expenditures-especially if
those increases greatly exceed lost income from sick days. How-
ever, the balance of cost and quality rarely invovles such an ob-
vious point of consensus. The immediate objective here is to
develop a conceptual framework within which more typical (and
common) cases can be examined. Thus, no effort will be taken
to develop a set of relative values between cost and quality here.
The scenarios in which a cost-benefit analysis is appropriate
can be categorized into four groups, two of which include cases
that are difficult to resolve and two of which are relatively easy.
The two types of more difficult cases include situations where
increased expenditures produce a corresponding improvement
in clinical outcomes, or where a decrease in expenditures results
in a diminution in the quality of care. In instances where the
compensation arrangement causes both costs and quality either
to increase or decrease, it will be necessary to determine
whether the increase or decrease in one is justified by the paral-
lel increase or decrease in the other. These types of cases are
difficult because health and money are valued differently and
cannot be adequately compared using a single unit of measure.
Not all compensation arrangements are as difficult to evalu-
ate. A compensation arrangement clearly fails a cost-benefit
analysis if it drives up costs while the quality of clinical out-
comes decreases. If such an arrangement involves compensa-
tion in exchange for referrals, it is and should be illegal under
the anti-kickback statute. On the other hand, if a compensation
arrangement improves clinical outcomes and either reduces or
maintains costs, the arrangement should pass muster under a
cost-benefit analysis.
Given the legislative intent of the anti-kickback statute, a
compensation arrangement that improves clinical outcomes at
no cost should be approved unless there is a compelling reason
to prohibit it. Indeed, the anti-kickback statute is self-defeating
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to the extent that it prohibits compensation arrangements that
improve clinical outcomes without increasing costs.2 °8
B. Gainsharing, Disease Management Programs, and
Legal Defenses
Under an outcomes-based, cost-benefit approach, disease
management programs, gainsharing and other compensation ar-
rangements would be analyzed very differently than at present.
The legal test of a given arrangement would be whether it im-
proves cost-effectiveness. It would be unnecessary to fit an effi-
ciency-enhancing compensation arrangement within safe
harbors or to guess the OIG's interpretation of intent. Instead,
providers could gain a clear indication of whether a given ar-
rangement is permissible by developing the appropriate out-
comes data. For example, a gainsharing plan that compensates
physicians with a fair portion of the savings attributable to their
innovations would pass muster if the arrangement improves
cost-effectiveness. Likewise, a disease management program
compensating a pharmaceutical manufacturer for patient man-
agement would be judged under the same principle.
The proposal here is that the parties to a compensation ar-
rangement should be able to assert as an affirmative defense to
an anti-kickback claim that the arrangement in question im-
proves cost-effectiveness. To raise the defense, the parties
would need to develop the necessary outcomes data to credibly
demonstrate this point. This might require a neutral party to
conduct the supporting outcomes research. In any event, plac-
ing the burden on the parties to the arrangement would accom-
plish two important objectives. First, it encourages the parties
to conduct outcome studies before implementing any questiona-
ble compensation arrangements on a large scale. Second, it con-
serves governmental resources that would otherwise be used to
collect the data necessary to show that any number of suspect
arrangements did not enhance cost-effectiveness.
This proposal for an affirmative defense is not a perfect solu-
tion for private industry. An affirmative defense provides no
assurance against costly prosecutions, although it reduces the
likelihood. Second, the burden of producing outcomes data suf-
ficient to show cost-effectiveness is significant. However, the
burden is appropriately placed on the parties who have the
208. See id. at 276 (suggesting a statute or regulation that does not produce a net
benefit is self-defeating if its purpose is to achieve a net improvement).
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greatest access to the data and the most control over the clinical
outcomes.
CONCLUSION
The conclusion here, as stated in the introduction, is uncom-
plicated. The public interest is better served if outcomes are
taken into account when enforcing a statute that was originally
intended to protect patients and federal health care programs
against inappropriate utilization. The almost exclusive focus on
intent fails to achieve the desired result. For this reason, the
anti-kickback statute has proven too confusing and has created
unnecessary tensions between private objectives and law en-
forcement imperatives.
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